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To order, call 1-800-621-2736.Work and love, Freud wrote, are the "founda-
tion" of the "emotional lives of human beings."'
The social theorist Sebastian de Grazia added,
many years later, "without work, [the American] is a
damned soul."2 It has been said that "Without work, one
loses one's condition of being an adult."'3
Most of us take for granted the essentiality of work.
Yet, for persons with mental disabilities--especially severe
mental disabilities-the reality of the world is quite differ-
ent. Three-quarters of the latter universe is chronically
unemployed; those employed worked mostly on a part-
time basis, averaging twenty-two hours of work per week.4
It should be no surprise that such individuals "fare particu-
larly poorly in the labor market."' But it should be no less
surprising that even the most severely mentally disabled
persons frequently express the desire to work.
When I was director of New Jersey's Division of Men-
tal Health Advocacy (then, the largest state-wide legal ad-
vocacy office for persons institutionalized because of men-
tal disability),6 complaints about lack of work regularly
trailed only complaints about involuntary medication on
the list of patient grievances about the conditions of their
confinement. And, for a few years in the 1970s, courts
seemed sympathetic to patients' arguments, and began to
rule that, as part of the right to treatment, any work done
by institutionalized psychiatric patients had to be volun-
tary, therapeutic, and compensated;7 that the federal Fair
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Labor Standards Act applied to institutional work pro-
grams;' and, in a case ultimately settled by consent order,
that a specified percentage of all hospitalized patients had
a right to participate in voluntary, therapeutic, and com-
pensated work programs.9 This line of cases crashed in the
early 1980s (following a series of excruciatingly complex
decisions about the scope of the Tenth Amendment and
the commerce clause), 10 and the issue basically fell off the
radar screen of public interest lawyers who represent men-
tal patients." And it appears to be of even less interest to
legal academics.'
2
I point this out to underscore one of the anomalies
that is addressed, in part, by a new thought-provoking and
important collection of essays brought together by Profes-
sors Richard Bonnie and John Monahan, Mental Disorder,
Work Disability, and the Law. Bonnie is clear in his intro-
ductory chapter: issues of work disability have been "out-
side the mainstream of scholarship in mental health law;" 3
and marginalization has meant that the many important
and difficult issues raised by work disability have not been
subject to the kind of searching scrutiny that has brought
virtually every other aspect of public mental disability law
under the academic microscope.
This is all the more disconcerting because of the hyper-
attention that is paid to the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA),' 4 a law hailed by advocates for persons with
disabilities as "a breathtaking promise," "the most im-
portant civil rights act passed since 1964,"16 as the "Eman-
cipation Proclamation for those with disabilities," 7 and,
"without question, Congress' most innovative attempt to
address the pervasive problems of discrimination against
physically and mentally handicapped citizens."'" Yet, at first
blush, little in the first generation of ADA cases reflects
efforts to remediate this "grotesque history" or deals fron-
tally with these "crushing ... burdens." 9
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One of the great dilemmas of work disability law, of
course, is the tension between the ADA and benefit/entide-
ment programs, such as Supplemental Security Income or
Social Security Disability Insurance, that premise benefit
eligibility on an individual's "inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically de-
terminable physical or mental impairment which ... has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months."20 A recent article by Frank Ravitch
explores this relationship, concluding that the ADAs duty
to accommodate reasonably should not provide the Social
Security Administration with an additional basis for deny-
ing benefits or expanding the list of jobs that can be per-
formed by individuals with given disabilities. 21 Yet, this ten-
sion between the two approaches-one based on work ac-
commodation and one based on work inability-dominates
this entire area of the law.
Bonnie sets out the operating dilemma in this manner:
Advocates for people with mental disabilities have
been persistently dissatisfied with the operation of
work disability laws, and it is not hard to see why.
On the one hand, the rate of labor force participa-
tion among persons with serious mental disorders is
very low, even when compared with the rate of labor
force participation among people with physical con-
ditions, and there is no evidence that the Americans
with Disabilities Act has improved this dismal pic-
ture.... On the other hand, even though people with
mental disorders represent an increasing fraction of
disability benefit recipients, mental disability advo-
cacy groups argue that many seriously disabled people
who are unable to compete in the labor market are
unfairly denied benefits. 22
This basic conflict, then, is at the core of the impor-
tant policy debate on work and disability: Are persons with
mental disability unfairly excluded from the workplace
(perhaps because of unfounded assumptions or stereotypes
that have developed about such persons and their "lazi-
ness" or their "inability to cope" in a work environment),
or, contrarily, do allegedly prophylactic civil rights laws
give the marginally disabled (or those who are not, but
claim to be) inappropriate leverage either by threatening
ADA-based litigation or by successfully seeking benefits
that have the effect of discouraging such persons from ever
entering the work force?
This is an important conflict, and it reflects both the
ambivalence with which we treat the underlying issues,
and the basic unresolved tensions in other aspects of the
mental disability law system-tensions caused by what I
call sanism, the irrational prejudice of the same quality
and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and
are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sex-
ism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.3 The essays collected
by Bonnie and Monahan offer us an important first step on
the path toward understanding the relevant issues and to-
ward solving a difficult dilemma.
The editors chose to divide this book into four sec-
tions, and those sections effectively cover the pertinent
universe of issues: (1) a "wide-angle lens"24 examination of
the epidemiology of mental disorders, work disability, and
labor force participation; (2) an investigation of the choices
made by persons with mental disabilities as to whether to
seek benefits; (3) an examination of the various disability
benefits programs for which persons with mental disabili-
ties may be eligible; and (4) an examination of the role and
potential consequences of the ADA. These four different
focal points provide readers with the tools needed to assess
thoughtfully and reflectively the policy decisions that per-
meate this area of the law.
So what do we learn from this book? We learn that the
vast majority of persons with severe mental disorders are
unemployed,2 and that, of those who are employed, a
majority work part-time at unskilled jobs, often in a "sup-
ported" (for example, sheltered workshop, transitional, or
work-training) job program. 26 We also learn that only about
one-quarter of such persons receive a government disabil-
ity payment because of their mental illness, but that this
number is increasing. 27 We learn further that labor force
participation is much lower among persons with mental
disabilities than with physical disabilities, that mental dis-
ability "accentuates" other labor market disadvantages, and
that persons with mental disabilities do not reap the ben-
efits of an expansive labor market.
2
We learn further that a connection exists between role
identity and disability: "the loss of self, self-esteem, valued
social role, and other aspects of a nonpatient identity that
accompany self-labeling may lead to taking on or may re-
inforce the sick role, resulting in a poorer life and illness
course." 29 Just as important, "progressive role constriction
and the fusion of identity with illness among persons with
major mental illness contributes to, indeed constitutes,
chronicity.'3 0 In one of the strongest contributions to the
book, Sue Estroff et al. thus conclude:
Overall, the event-history findings demonstrate
that it is a combination of dysfunction, dependence,
and despair that direct individuals to disability in-
come.... Living on disability is a harsh reality of be-
ing mentally ill--seldom, it seems, a personal choice
but more a matter of necessity. The many costs of
being on disability challenge us to find alternatives
to "no other way to go.""
Questions of choice are also explored from different
perspectives. John Strauss and Larry Davidson make the
important point that researchers need to turn their atten-
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tion to "the context of individuals' actual lives to help us
determine who can best benefit from [the] advances [re-
flected in the ADA], in obtaining what kind of work, at
what point in the course of which illnesses, through which
kind of accommodations, and in what work sites." 32 And
Richard Warner and Paul Polak look at the "significant
disincentives" that face persons with mental disabilities who
seek to begin work or increase their working hours.33 Fi-
nally, Laurie Lee Hall sets out a practical and comprehen-
sive blueprint for a new research agenda that can best make
the ADA actually work for persons with severe mental ill-
nesses.
34
Bonnie and Monahan pick up the theme of this agenda
in their epilogue, and highlight five areas that should be
addressed in the next generation of work disability re-
search-the experience of workers with diagnosed mental
disorders; the public health perspective on the underlying
questions; the need to integrate the study of mental disor-
der and employment with the study of mental disorder and
unemployment; the potential use of work disability legis-
lation to provide "leverage" in the treatment process; and
the development of a comparative perspective on the ques-
tions before us.35 If scholars were to read carefully the es-
says collected in this book, and then were to follow these
directions, it is possible that we could take the first steps
toward resolving some of the tensions to which I earlier
referred-toward dealing with some of the systemic sanism
(reflected throughout the work disability/benefit system),
and toward a meaningful attempt at-finally-making that
system actually work for persons with severe mental dis-
abilities.
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